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MR. PRINZO’S BREAKTHROUGH AND 
THE LIMITS OF CONFIDENTIALITY 
NANCY J. MOORE* 
INTRODUCTION 
Engaging students in the Professional Responsibility course is not always 
easy.  They resent taking a required upper-level course,1 they don’t think the 
subject matter will be important to their professional or personal lives (except 
perhaps to help prepare them for the MPRE, which they also resent),2 and they 
expect the material to be dry and boring.3  There are many ways we attempt to 
overcome this resistance, including bringing in current events (particularly 
stories involving the ethics travails of successful lawyers or law firms),4 
emphasizing remedies other than lawyer discipline,5 and making use of a 
 
* Professor of Law and Nancy Barton Scholar, Boston University School of Law.  My thanks to 
the editors of the Saint Louis University Law Journal for organizing this special edition on 
Teaching Professional Responsibility. 
 1. See, e.g., Steven H. Goldberg, Bringing The Practice to the Classroom: An Approach to 
the Professionalism Problem, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 414, 419 (2000). 
 2. Id. 
 3. See, e.g., David B. Wilkins, The Professional Responsibility of Professional Schools to 
Study and Teach About the Profession, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 76, 89 (1999).  According to Wilkins, 
the Professional Responsibility course is “the most despised in the curriculum”; indeed, “the 
course is so despised that deans routinely have to dragoon faculty, clinicians, and practitioners to 
teach it.”  Id.  Nevertheless, as a member of the Boston University Law School Committee on 
Appointments for six of the seven years I have been here, I note that an increasing number of law 
teaching applicants list Professional Responsibility among the courses they would happily teach. 
 4. See, e.g., Nathan Koppel, Lawyer’s Charge Opens Window on Bill Padding, WALL ST. 
J., Aug. 30, 2006, at B1 (discussing a 42-year old partner who left a 1,200 lawyer firm because 
his own hours on a case had been inflated by the billing partner).  I invite students to bring in 
newspaper clippings, which I will discuss that day regardless of where we are in the syllabus.  I 
also email them links to news stories that I find on law.com, e.g., a story about Florida lawyers 
who were reprimanded for a commercial featuring “the image of a pit bull wearing a spiked collar 
and the phone number 1-800-PIT-BULL.”  Carl Jones, “Pit Bull” Lawyers Reprimanded by Fla. 
Bar, DAILY BUS. REV., Apr. 10, 2006, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1144414533046. 
 5. For example, a lawyer’s obligation to avoid impermissible conflicts is enforceable in 
contexts other than lawyer discipline, including fee forfeiture, lawsuits seeking damages for 
breach of fiduciary duties, and disqualification.  See, e.g., Nancy J. Moore, Restating the Law of 
Lawyer Conflicts, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 541, 543 (1997).  In this vein, I will often mention 
various cases in which I have consulted as a legal ethics expert, typically in legal malpractice and 
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number of currently available audio-visual aids, including clips from movies 
and television shows, as well as documentaries.6 
Since the early 1980s, I have occasionally used a short story by Bruce J. 
Friedman entitled Mr. Prinzo’s Breakthrough7 when I teach the limits of the 
obligation of confidentiality.  My students love the story (as do I), and I have 
found it to be an effective way to engage them in debating the different 
approaches states take to the confidentiality exceptions, including rules that 
severely restrict the circumstances when a lawyer is permitted to disclose 
information in order to prevent harm to others. 
In the mid to late ‘80s, I demonstrated the teaching of this story to an 
Association of American Law Schools (AALS) Workshop on Teaching 
Professional Responsibility.  Since then, I have several times started to turn my 
teaching notes into an article, in which I would use the story to illustrate my 
views of confidentiality and its limits,8 but somehow that project never got 
finished.  Imagine then how delighted I was that the editors of the Saint Louis 
University Law Journal organized this special edition on Teaching 
Professional Responsibility, thereby enabling me to polish up my teaching 
notes and get them published without having to finish that article! 
So here’s what I’m going to do.  First, I’ll give you a quick summary of the 
plot (but you really must read the story for yourselves, even if you have no 
intention of teaching it).  Then I’ll tell you a little bit about the background 
 
breach of fiduciary duty lawsuits and motions for disqualification.  Students who cannot envision 
themselves as a subject of lawyer discipline can readily identify with lawyers being sued by 
former clients.  Describing my role as an expert also reinforces for students that my knowledge 
derives from real world experience.  I credit my daughter, Emily Moore Kanes, a fourth-grade 
teacher, for urging me to talk to my students about my own experiences in the field. 
 6. See, e.g., ROGER C. CRAMTON, AUDIOVISUAL MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 1–166 (1987) (listing movies, documentaries, and educational films, with plot 
summaries and teaching notes); Memorandum from Deborah L. Rhode, Director Stanford 
University Keck Center on Legal Ethics and the Legal Profession (undated) (on file with author) 
(enclosing annotated bibliography on innovative legal ethics teaching materials); see also 
Goldberg, supra note 1 (discussing a course on professionalism centering on episodes from the 
television series The Practice).  Several years ago, David Logan (Dean, Roger Williams 
University Law School), Bruce Green (Professor, Fordham University School of Law), and I had 
a contract with Aspen Publishing Co. for a new Professional Responsibility casebook that would 
use videoclips from The Practice to be purchased by students as part of the casebook materials.  
We thought we had all of the necessary copyright permissions (David E. Kelley, a BU Law 
School alumnus, was willing to give us his copyright permission at no charge, as were two of the 
four unions involved); however, at the last minute we discovered that we did not have and could 
not get the permission of Fox Television, and the project was scuttled. 
 7. BRUCE J. FRIEDMAN, Mr. Prinzo’s Breakthrough, in FAR FROM THE CITY OF CLASS 
AND OTHER STORIES, 108–24 (1963). 
 8. See generally Nancy J. Moore, Limits to Attorney-Client Confidentiality: A 
“Philosophically Informed” and Comparative Approach to Legal and Medical Ethics, 36 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 177 (1986). 
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material on confidentiality the students have read.  Finally, I’ll give you a list 
of questions I assign in advance to provide a framework for the class 
discussion, outlining the points I attempt to elicit in class with respect to each 
of those questions. 
I.  MR. PRINZO’S BREAKTHROUGH—THE PLOT 
This absurd, black humor short story is yet another masterpiece from 
Bruce J. Friedman, author of a short story that was turned into The Heartbreak 
Kid,9 a movie starring Charles Grodin and Cybill Shepherd (as the unattainable 
shiksa goddess10).  I have no idea what Friedman had in mind when he wrote 
Prinzo, but it was recommended to me many years ago by a medical ethicist as 
a useful tool for discussing ethical aspects of the professional obligation of 
confidentiality.11  The fact that it involves a physician and not a lawyer is of no 
concern; indeed, I often use hypotheticals involving physicians (and other 
professionals) to make it easier for law students to adopt the consumer 
perspective.12 
Prinzo has been in therapy for seven years.13  He complains to Tobes, his 
analysist, that two of his friends have had their “breakthroughs” but he, Prinzo, 
is not yet cured of the “cringe” that initially brought him to therapy.14  
Searching for an explanation, Prinzo suggests that he has been “holding plenty 
back,” whereupon Tobes concedes that he has been deficient in not telling 
Prinzo about the “pure and sacred” compact of confidentiality—“the most 
inviolable compact known to the civilized world.”15  Responding to Prinzo’s 
 
 9. THE HEARTBREAK KID (Palomar Pictures Corp. 1972).  For the short story on which the 
movie is based, see BRUCE J. FRIEDMAN, A Change of Plan, in THE COLLECTED SHORT FICTION 
OF BRUCE JAY FRIEDMAN, 74–79 (1995). 
 10. A “shiksa” is “a non-Jewish woman.”  Bubby Gram, http://www.bubbygram.com/ 
yiddishglossary.htm (scroll down to glossary) (last visited May 20, 2007).  “A ‘Shiksa Goddess’ 
is a blond beauty, the type of woman who instills a deep longing in dark, short, swarthy Jewish 
men, (probably because she is the polar opposite of his mother.) Grace Kelly was the 
quintessential ‘Shiksa Goddess.’”  Id.  Cybill Shepherd filled the bill of the shiksa goddess in The 
Heartbreak Kid, while Charles Grodin was brilliant as the Jewish newlywed who dumps his bride 
on their honeymoon to pursue his dream blond.  See THE HEARTBREAK KID, supra note 9. 
 11. My thanks to Edmund Erde, PhD, a philosopher and medical ethicist on the staff of 
University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey—School of Osteopathic Medicine, with 
whom I worked on numerous occasions when I was teaching at Rutgers-Camden Law School in 
New Jersey. 
 12. For several efforts at comparing medical and legal ethics, see, for example, Nancy J. 
Moore, Entrepreneurial Doctors and Lawyers: Regulating Business Activities in the Medical and 
Legal Professions, in ROY G. SPECE, JR., ET AL, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN CLINICAL PRACTICE 
AND RESEARCH 171–96 (1996); Moore, supra note 8; Nancy J. Moore, What Doctors Can Learn 
From Lawyers About Conflicts of Interest, 81 B.U. L. REV. 445 (2001). 
 13. FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 108. 
 14. Id. at 109. 
 15. Id. at 109–11. 
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questioning, Tobes elaborates that even if Prinzo told him he had committed a 
murder, Tobes would break the compact only if he thought Prinzo’s welfare 
was endangered: “That’s the key to it, don’t you see.  Your life.  Your welfare.  
Whatever’s best for you, my patient.”16  Prinzo mutters, “If I could only 
believe that.”17 
Prinzo then goes out and commits a murder.18  At his next therapy session, 
he announces that he has done so in order to “test the compact”19 and that the 
woman he has murdered is Tobes’s wife.20  Tobes tries to keep his shock and 
grief under control and offers to “do some dreams.”21  But Prinzo demands that 
Tobes help him dispose of the body.22  Tobes first declines, but Prinzo insists 
(“[a]nything that’ll make me feel better.  You said that’s the key to it all.”23), 
and Tobes reluctantly agrees.24  He helps Prinzo toss the body in the ocean, 
agrees to let Prinzo spend the night at his house, helps Prinzo make 
arrangements to take a boat to Barbados, and sees Prinzo off at the dock.25 
As he is boarding, Prinzo insists that Tobes agree to write him in Barbados 
and that he wave goodbye.26  As Tobes waves, Prinzo lifts his head and notices 
that he is “standing up straight,” out of his “cringe.”27  Tobes’s eyes brighten.28  
Shouting, “You’re cured!  You’ve had your breakthrough,” he grabs a 
patrolman and shouts, “And you’re not my patient anymore.”29 
II.  BACKGROUND READING 
Before having my students read the story, I assign the 2001 version of 
American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rule 1.6,30 the current version of that 
rule,31 and several state variations (including the New Jersey rules, which 
 
 16. Id. at 111–12. 
 17. Id. at 112. 
 18. FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 115. 
 19. Id. at 115. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 116. 
 22. Id. 
 23. FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 116–17 
 24. Id. at 117. 
 25. Id. at 117–23. 
 26. Id. at 123–24. 
 27. Id. at 124. 
 28. FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 124. 
 29. Id. 
 30. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2001).  Adopted originally in 1983, this 
version of the rule permits disclosure to protect others only when necessary “to prevent the client 
from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or 
substantial bodily harm.”  Id. at R. 1.6(b)(1). 
 31. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2007).  As amended in 2002 in response to 
the recommendations of the Ethics 2000 Commission, and again in 2003 in response to the 
recommendations of the Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, the rule now permits disclosure: 
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require disclosure in some circumstances,32 and the current Rhode Island rules, 
which follow the 2001 version of the ABA rule33).  We discuss the fact that all 
of these rules adopt a prima facie obligation of confidentiality broadly covering 
all information relating to the representation34 (in contrast with the attorney-
client evidentiary privilege, which protects only confidential client 
communications35).  We then note the significant differences in these rules 
regarding the attorney’s ability (or obligation) to disclose information when 
necessary to protect other interests, including preventing physical or economic 
harm to third parties. 
In addition to the rules themselves, I assign material that elaborates on the 
policy rationales underlying both the prima facie obligation of confidentiality 
and the various exceptions.36  With respect to the prima facie obligation of 
confidentiality, we discuss both utilitarian justifications (encouraging a client 
to disclose information to enable the attorney to effectively provide the legal 
services requested) and deontological justifications (protecting a client’s right 
to privacy).37  These perspectives may already have been introduced, in a 
section of the course in which we discuss the dilemma of a lawyer asked to 
help a client in a morally noxious but lawful scheme.38 
 
“to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm”; “to prevent the client from 
committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the 
financial interests or property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is 
using the lawyer’s services”; and “to prevent mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial 
interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client’s 
commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer’s services.”  
Id. at R. 1.6(b)(1)–(3). 
 32. See N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2006), available at 
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/rules/apprpc.htm (requiring disclosure of crimes or frauds 
threatening either death or substantial bodily harm or substantial economic harm). 
 33. See R.I.  RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2006), available at http://www.courts. 
state.ri.us/supreme/disciplinary/rulesofprofessionalconduct.htm. 
 34. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2007) (providing that a lawyer 
may not “reveal information relating to the representation of a client” except in certain 
circumstances). 
 35. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (2000). 
 36. See Moore, supra note 8, at 187–91, 196–245 (discussing well-developed philosophical 
justifications for the principle of medical confidentiality and then applying these justifications to 
the principle of legal confidentiality). 
 37. See id. 
 38. See, e.g., Symposium, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 
613 (1986). 
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III.  DISCUSSING THE STORY 
The most obvious message of Prinzo is the absurdity of an absolute 
obligation of professional confidentiality.39  I point out this fact; then I ask 
whether either the medical or the legal profession seeks to impose such an 
absolute obligation.  Students might not be familiar with the American Medical 
Association’s (AMA) Principles of Medical Ethics (which require doctors to 
“safeguard patient confidences within the constraints of the law”),40 but they 
are usually aware of statutory obligations to report gunshot wounds41 and 
suspected child abuse.42  As for lawyers, even the most restrictive of the 
current state rules (based on the 1983 version of the Model Rules) permits 
lawyers to disclose client information in order to prevent imminent death or 
physical harm as a result of a threatened client crime (as well as to collect their 
fees).43  I also have my students point out other “mistakes” in the story, 
including the apparent assumption that the obligation of confidentiality ends 
with the termination of the professional relationship44 and the suggestion that 
professionals are permitted, perhaps even required, to engage in illegal acts 
such as disposing of bodies.45  (More on that shortly.)  The story is absurd.  
Nevertheless, I suggest that the story might help us evaluate the proper limits 
of professional confidentiality by illustrating (in a highly exaggerated way) 
some of the difficulties of extremely client-centered ethics, such as those 
espoused by some commentators.46 
In addition to the background material and the story itself, I assign a study 
sheet that asks students to think about the relevance of the story in determining 
the proper limits of confidentiality.  The sheet contains five questions (or series 
of questions) that I use to provide a framework for the class discussion.  Here, I 
will outline that framework by setting out each of the five questions, followed 
 
 39. Tobes tells Prinzo that there are “a few” circumstances in which the compact can be 
broken, but the only example he gives is if Prinzo were to commit suicide.  FRIEDMAN, supra 
note 7, at 111. 
 40. AM. MED. ASS’N., COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUD. AFF., CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: 
CURRENT OPINIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS xiv (2000). 
 41. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12A (2006). 
 42. See, e.g., id. at ch. 119, § 51A (2006). 
 43. See supra notes 30–35 and accompanying text. 
 44. Lawyers continue to owe a duty of confidentiality to former clients, with no exception 
for deceased clients.  See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9(c) (2007). 
 45. Lawyers are not permitted to counsel or assist a client in conduct the lawyer knows is 
either criminal or fraudulent.  See, e.g., id. at R. 1.2(d). 
 46. For examples of what I characterize as extremely client-centered ethics, see Monroe H. 
Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest 
Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966); Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral 
Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976); Stephen L. Pepper, The 
Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 613 (1986). 
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by the points I try to elicit in class with respect to each.  Although I do this 
here in terms of my own observations, I try in class to get the students to bring 
out these and other points. 
Question 1.  In the initial discussion of doctor/patient confidentiality, both 
Prinzo and Tobes appear to agree that Prinzo’s failure to achieve a 
“breakthrough” may have been the result of Prinzo’s failure to be completely 
candid, which is in turn attributed to Tobes’s failure to advise him of the 
virtually absolute rules of professional confidentiality.47  Is it likely that 
Prinzo’s failure to achieve his breakthrough was a result of his failure to be 
completely candid with Tobes?  Is it likely that his failure to be completely 
candid was a result of Tobes’s failure to discuss confidentiality?  What did 
cause Prinzo’s breakthrough?  What other factors might have discouraged 
Prinzo from confiding in his therapist? 
The point here is to question the utilitarian assumptions that (1) assurances 
of confidentiality are necessary to encourage clients to confide in attorneys (or 
patients to confide in doctors) and (2) such confidences are necessary to 
achieve results as to which it can be concluded that the benefits of 
confidentiality outweigh the harms of non-disclosure.  These are empirical 
assumptions for which we might demand some evidence. 
It is not uncommon for either doctors or lawyers to omit any discussion of 
confidentiality or its limits.48  (When was the last time any doctor of theirs 
spoke to them about confidentiality?49)  Nevertheless, Prinzo’s friends got their 
breakthroughs, other patients get cured, and many clients achieve their desired 
results.  Prinzo himself revealed a number of intimate details before he got the 
assurance of confidentiality, including the fact that he was “a toenail 
muncher.”50  (Even after the murder, Prinzo almost spilled the beans to his 
sister-in-law whom he encountered on the beach.51)  Most of us generally have 
some understanding of the obligation of professional confidentiality, and 
although some might mistakenly believe that confidentiality is absolute, it is 
probably true that more believe that disclosure is permitted in some instances 
(although we might not be sure exactly when).52  With that store of imprecise 
 
 47. FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 109–11. 
 48. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351, 382–83 
(1989) (reporting that 22.6% of lawyers surveyed “almost never” informed their clients about the 
obligation of confidentiality). 
 49. Doctors are now required by the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act (HIPAA) regulations to post notices regarding their privacy policies.  45 C.F.R. § 
164.520(a)(1) (2004).  I doubt many patients actually read the notices or that many doctors 
discuss them with their patients.  That is certainly my own experience. 
 50. FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 110. 
 51. Id. at 120. 
 52. See Zacharias, supra note 48, at 383 (reporting that less than half of clients surveyed 
believed that lawyer confidentiality is absolute, while the remainder were split between those who 
believed that confidentiality exceptions are limited to particular types of information and those 
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knowledge, it is entirely likely that patients and clients typically reveal private 
information because they recognize that the professional cannot do an effective 
job without that information (and, in some cases, because of their own 
psychological needs).53 
Why didn’t Prinzo reveal more?  What does create trust in professional 
relationships?  In Prinzo’s case it certainly was not the verbal assurance of 
confidentiality because Prinzo felt he had to test that assurance by committing 
a murder.  Obviously, he didn’t trust Tobes.  Why not?  There are hints.  Tobes 
was distant and formal and wouldn’t even call Prinzo by his first name.54  As 
Robert Burt has explained, trust in interpersonal relationship depends more on 
interpersonal dynamics than on any verbal formulas.55 
What did cure Prinzo’s cringe?  I always hope that some student will 
answer that what cured Prinzo was revealing to Tobes the confidential 
information that Prinzo had committed the murder and that, as a result, 
confidentiality was clearly the key to Prinzo’s cure.  At this point, I ask them to 
look very carefully for the first sign of the absence of the cringe.  In fact, it is 
the murder itself that permits Prinzo to stand “erect” and not the subsequent 
disclosure.56  Using utilitarian reasoning, is curing a cringe worth the loss of an 
innocent life?  Clearly not.  Do we have any assurance that the long-run 
benefits of nearly absolute confidentiality are worth the harm that is neither 
prevented nor rectified?57  Who should bear the burden of proof? 
A good example to test the limits of confidentiality using utilitarian 
reasoning is the AIDS epidemic.  Assurances of confidentiality might be 
important in getting some patients to see a doctor, but the doctor’s failure to 
 
who believed that more liberal disclosure is permitted).  According to Professor Zacharias’s 
survey, the clients “overwhelmingly stated” that lawyers should be able to disclose information to 
prevent harm to third persons in a variety of situations.  Id. at 400–01. 
 53. If assurances of confidentiality are essential in order to persuade patients or clients to 
disclose information relevant to treatment or representation, then surely the professionals are 
obligated to simultaneously provide information concerning the possible exceptions to 
confidentiality, even though that might deter the disclosure of relevant information.  See generally 
Lee A. Pizzimenti, The Lawyer’s Duty to Warn Clients About Limits of Confidentiality, 39 CATH. 
U. L. REV. 441 (1990). 
 54. FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 110. 
 55. See Robert A. Burt, Conflict and Trust Between Attorney and Client, 69 GEO. L.J. 1015 
(1981). 
 56. “A little later [after the murder], Mr. Prinzo lifted [the victim’s] lifeless form behind the 
counter of the deserted Carvel stand and propped her up against an old sundae machine.  He stood 
erect, flexed his arms and said, ‘Violence inhabits the meek, too.’”  FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 
115.  He is not seen cringing again. 
 57. See Nancy J. Moore, “In the Interests of Justice”: Balancing Client Loyalty and the 
Public Good in the Twenty-First Century, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1775, 1779–81 (2002) 
(concluding that, given the lack of empirical evidence supporting the utilitarian assumptions of 
the proponents of nearly absolute confidentiality, the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission was justified 
in urging the adoption of a rule permitting more disclosure to prevent harm to others). 
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advise sexual partners who might contract the disease could cause more harm 
in the long run.58  Students will often point to the “wrongful” act of an AIDS 
patient who refuses to warn a sexual partner, thus leading to a discussion of the 
deontological reasoning underlying confidentiality rules. 
Question 2.  What right did Prinzo have to commit a murder to test the limits 
of confidentiality?  Didn’t Mrs. Tobes have a right not to be murdered (and 
Prinzo a duty not to murder her)?  Did Prinzo’s right to privacy override the 
victim’s rights? 
Under deontological (i.e., non-utilitarian) approaches, the limits of 
confidentiality are determined by balancing the patient’s or client’s right to 
privacy against equal or more basic rights or duties.59  For example, the general 
obligation of physicians to report contagious diseases is justified by the 
physician’s duty to prevent serious bodily harm.60  Similarly, the lawyer’s duty 
to prevent intentionally false testimony (even when doing so requires the 
lawyer to reveal client perjury) is justified by the lawyer’s duty to protect the 
integrity of the trial process.61  According to a moral theologian, a person who 
intentionally subjects others to unwarranted risks or harms is an “unjust 
aggressor” who forfeits his or her right to privacy.62 
Using this reasoning, it is not difficult to conclude that Prinzo forfeited his 
right to privacy when he deliberately violated Mrs. Tobes’s right to live for no 
better reason than to test her husband’s assurance of confidentiality.  On the 
other hand, if he had already committed a murder when he first sought 
psychiatric or legal advice, then his right to privacy would not have been 
overridden by any rights of the victim.63 
 
 58. This is precisely the empirical disagreement between the majority and dissenting 
opinions in Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of Cal., in which the majority argued that more 
lives would be saved by requiring psychotherapists to reveal death threats, while the dissent 
argued that more lives would be saved by maintaining confidentiality, which would encourage 
patients to seek therapy and thereby be dissuaded from engaging in violence.  551 P.2d 334 
(1976). 
 59. See Moore, supra note 8, at 194. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3), (b), cmts. (2007). 
 62. ROBERT E. REGAN, THE MORAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING PROFESSIONAL SECRECY 
WITH AN INQUIRY INTO SOME OF THE MORE IMPORTANT PROFESSIONAL SECRETS, 104–06 
(1943); see also Moore, supra note 8 at 194 n.80 (discussing Regan’s view). 
 63. Students generally agree that the lawyers in the famous “buried bodies” case were not 
morally obligated to reveal their client’s confession merely to relieve the suffering of the victims’ 
parents.  Cf. People v. Belge, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798 (N.Y. County Ct. 1975), aff’d, 376 N.Y.S.2d 771 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1975), aff’d, 359 N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. 1976) (overturning indictment of one of the 
lawyers for violating the public health code on the ground that the attorney-client privilege 
justified his silence).  If, however, the victims were still alive, most students believe that the 
lawyers should have disclosed their whereabouts.  The defendant might or might not be an 
“unjust aggressor” in that case, but shouldn’t the victims’ right to live outweigh the defendant’s 
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Question 3.  What is the significance of Prinzo’s statement to Mrs. Tobes (then 
a nameless woman) that he might not have murdered her if she had been the 
woman he wanted her to be?64  Did Prinzo have responsibilities to others?  To 
himself?  Where might Prinzo have gotten the idea that everyone is to blame 
but him? 
In his statement to Mrs. Tobes, Prinzo expressed an attitude of extreme 
egoism and narcissism.  He refused to accept any responsibility for what he 
was doing.  He blamed the victim herself.  This statement echoes the earlier 
scene in which he blamed Tobes for his (Prinzo’s) failure to achieve a 
breakthrough, refusing to accept any responsibility for his failure to reveal the 
intimate details that might have assisted Tobes in the therapy.65  Although the 
professional-client relationship is typically one of dependency, don’t both 
clients and patients bear some responsibility for their own care?66 
Prinzo maintained his narcissistic attitude throughout the story.  Even at 
the end, Prinzo demanded that Tobes mail him postcards and letters, claiming 
that if he didn’t, Prinzo wouldn’t get his breakthrough and it would be Tobes’s 
fault.67  Of course, neither doctors’ nor lawyers’ ethical rules require or even 
permit a professional to assist or cover up a crime.68  Nevertheless, Prinzo’s 
assumption is an obvious extension of the position espoused by Tobes when 
describing the compact of confidentiality.  (Recall: “That’s the key to it, don’t 
you see.  Your life.  Your welfare.  Whatever’s best for you, my patient.”69)  
The connection between Prinzo’s attitude that he is entitled to anything that 
will make him feel better (including involving his therapist in covering up the 
crime and the confidentiality “compact”) is also suggested in Prinzo’s 
following statement, as the two of them walk along the beach: “I’d like to go 
down below and get my feet wet, as long as we’re out here.  One thing that has 
come through in these last seven years is that I’m to just sally forth and grab 
 
right to privacy?  What about a client who confesses to a crime for which another person has been 
convicted and sentenced to death?  See generally Symposium, Executing the Wrong Person: The 
Professionals’ Ethical Dilemmas, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1543 (1996).  These are not necessarily 
easy cases, just as the proper policy for maintaining the confidentiality of AIDS patients is by no 
means obvious. 
 64. FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 114. 
 65. Id. at 109–110. 
 66. Cf. Moore, supra note 8, at 220–21, n.204 (“[T]here is no violation of ‘human dignity’ 
when a criminal defendant is deterred from full disclosure” to his attorney because he believes the 
disclosure will disadvantage his case, particularly when the attorney has advised the defendant 
“that while he cannot permit the client to commit perjury, he will be in a better position to make 
an effective defense if the client is completely candid”). 
 67. FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 123. 
 68. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2007); see also supra text 
accompanying note 40 (explaining that the AMA Principles of Medical Ethics require the doctor 
to respect confidentiality “within the limits of the law”). 
 69. FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 112. 
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my pleasures where I may.”70  Perhaps Tobes’s failure to put any limits on his 
willingness to do whatever it takes to effect a cure encouraged Prinzo to 
develop this attitude. 
Question 4.  After the murder, Prinzo and Tobes appear to have switched roles.  
Prinzo was assertive and in control: Tobes was passive and compliant (perhaps 
even “cringing”).  How do you feel towards Tobes at this point?  Why?  Do 
professionals have rights, too?  What about their responsibilities?  Do 
professionals have obligations to third persons?  What “sacred compact” did 
Tobes violate? 
Tobes was pathetic, failing to adequately assert himself in his right to cry, 
to mourn the loss of his wife, and to break off the therapy.71  Prinzo kept 
hearkening back to the earlier description of the obligation of confidentiality: 
“There are no limits . . . . I’m your patient and the only thing in the world that 
counts is how I feel.”72  Getting Tobes to stop crying, Prinzo said, “Do try to 
be strong . . . . If you get flustered, I’ll be all upset, and you’re not allowed to 
let me be that way.”73  Prinzo won’t let Tobes exhibit any of the normal human 
responses to his wife’s death: “YOU MUSTN’T BE STERN.”74 
We might feel sorry for Tobes for his weakness.  A deontological view of 
the professional-client relationship should emphasize the mutuality of a 
relationship between two persons.  Professionals have rights, too (including the 
right to collect their fees), and they ought to be able to assert them.75  On the 
other hand, we also condemn Tobes not only for his inability to assert himself, 
but also for his unwillingness to do so, thereby encouraging Prinzo in his 
selfishness. 
Moreover, Tobes had responsibilities to others, as well as himself.  Didn’t 
he have responsibilities to his wife?  After all, marriage is also a “sacred 
compact,” arguably more sacred than the doctor-patient or lawyer-client 
“compact.”  Didn’t Tobes violate his duty to bring her murderer to justice, or at 
least to ensure her a proper burial?76  Prohibitions on lawyer disclosure might 
encourage clients to assume that the lawyer approves of the client’s conduct.  
At the same time, lawyers often assume that clients cannot be persuaded to 
 
 70. Id. at 119. 
 71. Id. at 117–24. 
 72. Id. at 122. 
 73. Id. at 118. 
 74. FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 118. 
 75. Cf. Moore, supra note 57, at 1781–82 (explaining that the Ethics 2000 Commission’s 
proposal to permit more lawyer disclosure of a client’s economic crimes and frauds—but only 
when the lawyer’s services have been used—was based not on “an affirmative duty of lawyers to 
further the public good, but rather as limitations on lawyers’ obligations of loyalty to their clients, 
thereby freeing them to act as independent moral agents”). 
 76. One of my students contributed his own moment of black humor when he quipped, “But 
it’s only ‘til death do us part.”) 
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renounce their illegal plans, and as a result, lawyers don’t even bother to 
express their disapproval—hardly an ideal relationship. 
Question 5.  What sort of “breakthrough” did Prinzo really achieve?  Was he 
really cured when he set forth for Barbados? 
Prinzo’s failure to achieve any “breakthrough” during his seven years of 
analysis might be partially explained by the depersonalized, distancing attitude 
arguably encouraged by an excessively patient-centered rule of confidentiality.  
Ironically, an unquestioning adherence on the part of professionals to “what’s 
best” for patients or clients might not actually further their best interests.  It 
certainly did not cause Tobes to care for Prinzo in a way that might have 
encouraged more trust and an eventual cure. 
Committing a murder might have permitted Prinzo to stand up straight; 
however, his ability to stand up straight and assert himself aggressively might 
not gain him happiness in the long run.  Was he really better off after the 
murder than before?  He thought he was, but of course he was at risk of having 
his crime exposed.77  More important, we are left with the impression that 
when things do not work out just as he envisions, he will once again blame 
Tobes (or somebody else) for all his problems.  With this attitude, he is 
unlikely to form the sorts of relationships he will need in order to live a 
fulfilling life. 
CONCLUSION 
Rereading my notes, my only qualm is that I appear to be pushing my own 
agenda a bit too much, which ordinarily I don’t like to do.  In class, I do try to 
remain open to students with different views, including those who argue for a 
stronger role for confidentiality than I personally think is justified.  In any 
event, the students love the story, and the debate is lively, whether we’re 
focusing on lawyers or doctors.  Now, if I can only figure out a way to make 
The Heartbreak Kid relevant to legal ethics. 
 
 
 77. Remember, his sister-in-law saw him on the beach where Tobes and Prinzo threw the 
body into the ocean.  He introduced her to “Gar Tobes” and said to her, “We’re just out here 
doing something.  How come you didn’t ask me what?”  FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 120.  
Sounds to me like there was a fairly good chance his crime would be detected even if Tobes 
hadn’t turned him in at the end of the story. 
